Western countries have been relatively timid in their response to Tunisian President Kais Saied’s takeover. Unlike their rapid suspension of aid to Sudan after the recent coup, Western countries have only exerted rhetorical pressure on Tunisia. Part of the reluctance is fear of what might happen if the West pressured Saied more forcefully – that Saied might instead look to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for foreign aid. The implication is that the West should not push too hard for dialogue and democracy for fear of losing Tunisia in the Gulf.

But this is a false dichotomy. Given the magnitude of its plight, Tunisia is likely to need Western aid even if it receives aid from the Gulf. Seen in this light, the West should not just continue to pressure Saied to restore democracy and hold an inclusive dialogue, but intensify it. In addition, the West should directly push the Gulf countries to abandon the most toxic conditions that could be attached to their aid, such as the dissolution of certain political parties.

Between the West and the Gulf?

Three months after coming to power, Saied finally focused on the main concern of Tunisians: the faltering economy. The immediate challenge is to find the $ 3.5 billion needed to cover public sector salaries and debt repayments this year. Last month, the governor of the central bank, Marouane Abbasi, warned of “a serious shortage of external financial resources” to do so.

It is difficult to see how Tunisia can raise this amount without foreign support. The tourism sector is not going to improve anytime soon, given the pandemic. Saied initially offered another reconciliation with businessmen suspected of corruption, whereby they could avoid prosecution by funding projects in Tunisia’s neglected interior, but nothing has come to fruition yet. The trials of officials accused of corruption have proceeded slowly and do not provide a quick solution to Tunisia’s liquidity crisis. Saied recently offered to tackle tax evasion and cut spending, but neither is likely to be enough.

There are two main sources of foreign funding for Tunisia, and both come with implicit or explicit conditions. The first, which most Tunisian governments pursued, before and after the 2011 revolution, was loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to Reuters, such loans would likely require “a reform plan to tackle subsidies, high public sector payrolls and loss-making state-owned enterprises.” In practice, the IMF has often turned its back over the past 10 years, continuing to provide loans to Tunisia despite its lack of progress on these fronts. This is unlikely to change, given the scale of the Tunisian crisis. But what seems to have been added to the IMF conditions, again according to Reuters, is that Saied must define “a political roadmap that includes[s] broad political and social dialogue. Western governments also pushed Saied to engage in dialogue and restore democracy.

The other potential source of foreign aid would come from Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both have been strong supporters of Saied’s takeover and – like many other countries – have sent massive medical supplies to deal with the COVID-19 crisis in Tunisia. But billions of dollars in aid, on par with what these Gulf countries gave Egyptian Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi after his 2013 coup, is another matter, and would likely require Saied to take it. measures against political parties in Tunisia, especially those at the Islamist end of the spectrum.

Dissolving political parties is, I must say, not out of the realm of possibility: a sizeable number of Saied supporters have publicly called for the dissolution of Ennahda, and Saied himself has pressured the authorities to quash it. ‘They find irregularities in the 2019 elections that could justify their dissolution. Several members of the Karama coalition (among other parties) are tried by military courts for insulting the president and / or the security forces. Seeing the writing on the wall, some of Ennahda’s top leaders recently split up, apparently with the expectation of leading a new party if Ennahda is disbanded.

At this point, Tunisia appears to be wooing both the Gulf and the IMF. During her appointment last month, Prime Minister Najla Bouden hinted at a new package of reforms, saying that “the priority of her government is to balance public finances and carry out the necessary economic reforms”. Saied also shifted gears last month and announced plans to hold a national dialogue – though when and with whom remain uncertain. These steps suggest an attempt to meet IMF conditions, and Tunisia has now resumed technical talks with the IMF. However, Tunisian officials also revealed last month that they were in “very advanced talks with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to fill state coffers.”

A false dichotomy

It may be tempting to consider this choice as a branch: that Tunisia will choose either aid from the West or from the Gulf, and that this choice will put Tunisia on the path to either restoring democracy or the consolidation of autocracy. According to this logic, the political implication could be that the West does not push too hard for democracy, lest it push Saied to choose the Gulf. The timing of the revelation that Tunisia was negotiating with the Gulf, coming immediately after the IMF’s condition to hold a dialogue, seemed almost intentional, like a ploy to get the IMF to ease its terms.

But this point of view would be incorrect. The West and the Gulf are not necessarily alternative sources of funding. Egypt Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi received $ 12 billion in Gulf financing following his 2013 coup, but he is still being courted and received an IMF loan in 2016. Also in Tunisia, the Gulf is unlikely to be able to solve the country’s economic problems forever. – even if they close the budget deficit this year, Tunisia will eventually return to the IMF. With the Gulf mired in support for counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt, Libya and Sudan, that comeback could come sooner rather than later. Knowing this, the West should step up the pressure for democracy and dialogue, not abandon it.

Moreover, the West would do better to rely on the Gulf to abandon its more nefarious conditions of dissolving political parties. This will neither revitalize democracy nor lead to stability in Tunisia. At best, party dissolution will lead them to regroup into newer and weaker parties, producing an even more fractured political landscape. At worst, it will cause supporters to forgo the election, instead turning to more violent means to advance their political goals. In short, while recognizing that Tunisia is likely to continue helping the Gulf, the West should make a concerted effort to resist the political influence the Gulf hopes to gain through it.